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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction herein conferred upon the Court of Appeals
by Article V11I, Section 5 ot the Utah Constitution, &78-4-11
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, §77-35-26(3)(a), Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended (1987), Rule 3(a), Rule 4(a) and Rule
33 (a) ot the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal of a judgment by the Honorable David
W. Sorenson of the Second Circuit Court ot the State of Utah.
The Court having

found

there was

not

sufficient

evidence

presented, at the end of the State's case, found the defendant
not guilty.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
That the appellant was not able to present sufficient

-1-

Brief ot Respondent
State v. Chugg
Civil No. 870308-CA

evidence
was:

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defenaant

(a) arivmg or operating a vehicle upon the highways of the

State of Utah; (b) was in actual, physical control as required by
the Statutes; (c) was under the influence so as to be incapable
ot operating a motor vehicle; (d) that the defendant did not fall
within the exception of the Bugger case (483 P2d, 442); and , (e)
that the confession of the defendant, to prove the corpus delicti
was insufficient without independent evidence.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Statutes or cases.
A.

Utah Code Annotated, ^44-6-44(1) 1953 as amended

B.

Utah Code Annotated, ^76-1-501, 1953 as amended

C.

State v. Bugger, 483 P2d 442

D.

State v. Ferry, 273 P2d 173

E.

State v. Olsen, 75 Utah 583 (1930)

F.

State v. Petree 659 P2d 445
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The defendant Michael Chugg, after having been bowling
and having drunk several beers, left Ogden, Utah and drove north
to the parking lot on the west side of Hyrum dam in Cache County,
because he was sleepy, he pulled

off the road, after having

turned off his car and extinguished the lights, he tell asleep.
After having been asleep approximately one and one-half hours to
two hours he was awakened by a police officer who requested that
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he get out of the car.

Without being given the opportunity to

put on his glasses or properly awaken himself/ he was given
various tests and was then arrested tor driving under the
influence of alcohol.

After having been transported to the jail/

he submitted to a breath test and having been shown the results
of the test was asked whether or not he was intoxicated.
question, he replied, "Yes, in view of the test".

To that

His earlier

conversations with the officer were to the effect that he had
been drinking and that he had been asleep in the automobile. Two
sheriff's deputies participated in the arrest/ both of whom
testified that they had not seen the defendant drive nor could
they determine that the vehicle had recently been stopped.
Indeed/ one officer testified that he did not hear any cool down
noises from the vehicle.
Plaintiff

began

its trial without making

an opening

statement or announcing who the witnesses were to be / thus
defendant was not in a position to object to the confession by
the defendant that he had been drinking and driving.

Subsequent

to the time/ plaintiff relied exclusively upon the statement by
the defendant that he had been drinking and driving and offered
no evidence of the operation of the motor vehicle by the
defendant save and except for the statement ot the defendant.
After the two deputy sheriffs had testified/ the plaintiff rested
without offering the breath test results and explained the lack
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of said offer on the fact that the expert witness was not
available but was attending a seminar.

At no time did the

plaintiff seek a continuance nor make any effort to offer the
results but chose instead to rest. The defendant thereupon moved
the Court to dismiss citing lack of evidence/ the requirement of
the Bugger case, and because the court granted the acquittal
based on the lack of evidence and the factual similarity to the
Bugger case, the defendant did not raise the issue of Corpus
Delicti based on his confession.

The plaintiff having chosen to

appeal the decision and the defendant not having had to raise any
defense issues now raises the Corpus Delicti issue for the first
time on appeal.

Respondent further raised the issue of good

faith ana frivolity and asks for attorney's fees under Rule 33
(a) of the Rule of the Utah Court of Appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court, having heard the evidence as presented
to it by the plaintiff and having determined that the plaintiff
presented no evidence of Corpus Delicti save and except the
confession of the defendant, the plaintiff having presented no
driving pattern or evidence of driving, having presented no
scientific evidence of intoxication save and except the so called
Nystagmus test and having failed to prove the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, now asks the Appellate Court to
substitute its judgment on the evidence for the judgment of the
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trial court.
ARGUMENT
That insufficient evidence existed
conviction of the respondent.

to sustain a

In the case of State v. Ferry, the

Supreme Court ruled "that a defendant could not be convicted on
the basis

of his

confession

alone, that there must be

independent, clear and convincing
Delicti..."

evidence of the Corpus

ana in State v. Olsen, the Supreme Court of the

State of Utah ruled "that in the absence of a showing that the
defendant will be prejudiced thereby, to permit evidence of
statements and admissions of the defendant implicating him with
the crime charged before the existence of the Corpus Delicti is
established..."

It is error to admit the confession and

admission for the purpose of proving the Corpus Delicti.
In this case, the Corpus Delicti, necessary to be proved by
clear and convincing evidence (State v. Ferry) was that the
defendant/respondent (a) operated the motor vehicle, (b) while he
was impaired as a result of alcohol.

The appellant, having

chosen to move forward under that part of the statute having to
do with the operation of a vehicle within the state and then
having chosen not to offer any evidence of the breath alcohol (TR
p. 49) content showing that the respondent was "incapable of
safely operating a vehicle" must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
all of the facts of said case.

They are further in a position
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where in order to introduce and utilize the confession of the
defendant, to prove the Corpus Delicti, they must have clear and
convincing evidence, independent of his confession.

In this

case, neither officer saw the defendant operate the vehicle.

In

this case, the State determined not to offer the result of the
intoxilizer and thus, used only the defendant's confession that
he was intoxicated.

(TR page 20)

The appellant seeks now to use only the evidence of the
defendant's confession or admission that he was driving and that
he was intoxicated to prove his case but also to demonstrate that
the Court acted arbitrarily and capriciously in granting the
acquittal.
Appellant further suggests that the trial court reached it's
decision based upon the argument of counsel for the defendant,
apparently attempting to raise the said argument to the level of
the offer of, and receipt of, evidence, completely ignoring the
statutory and constitutional requirement that in a criminal case
a defendant is presumed innocent until proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is presented to the trier of the facts, changing the status
of the defendant from innocent to guilty.

In this case, as in

all criminal cases, when the State rests, the evidence of guilt
is in.

No evidence of innocence needs ever be presented and if

counsel then moves the court for an acquittal or a dismissal
based upon the lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the

-6-
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arguments of counsel, with respect to the presentation of that
motion, do not rise to the level of evidence or lack of evidence
in any case. The fact that at the end of the presentation of the
evidence, the Court had a nagging feeling on the one hand, (TR p.
60) he did have a nagging question because no one told the Court
that the defendant was incapable of safely operating the vehicle.
Such incapability

is a matter of proof and is one of the

essential elements of the Corpus Delicti. What appellant appears
not to understand

about the statute, with respect to the

operation of the motor vehicle, is that either you show the
operation of the vehicle coupled with incapability of operation
because of the influence of alcohol or you demonstrate some
evidence that, in fact, the defendant, ana only the defendant,
operated the vehicle immediately prior to the time that the
officers discovered the defendant in the car.
counsel cites, might be fresh tracks in the snow.

Such evidence,
Other courts

have determined that if an accident occurs, a presumption of
operation by the driver exists.

To overcome the impact of the

Bugger case and its operation upon the present case, the
appellant had the burden of proof.

The defendant/respondent told

them that he had been asleep, no cool down noises were heard by
the officers coming from the defendant/respondent's vehicle (TR
p. 48) and no attempt was made by the appellant to overcome the
fact that the defendant/respondent was not operating at the time
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of the discovery by the officers of the vehicle parked off the
highway.
marks.

There was no accident and there were no fresh snow tire
(TR p. 20)

Appellant chose to present no evidence

overcoming the possibility that the appellant might have been
asleep at the time of the discovery.

Without a driving pattern,

without evidence of operation, and without evidence of the
presumption of intoxication, the State still has the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant did not meet

that burden and thus the Court should be sustained.
CONCLUSION
As the Court stated in State v. Petri 659 P2d 445, "but
this does not mean that the Court can take a speculative leap
across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict.

The

evidence, stretched to it's utmost limits, must be sufficient to
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt".

Under no

circumstances can the evidence presented here be stretched so as
to sustain the burden which the State/Appellant had.
Respectfully submitted this^cr day of October, IjW•
C. DEMONT JUDD, J&
Attorney for
Defendant/Respondent

1 I W^
/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on this

day of October, 1987, I mailed a

true and correct copy of the foregoing first class mail ana
postage prepaid to: Jeffrey "R" Burbank, Deputy Cache County
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for Appellant,

160 North Main, Suite 203,

84321.
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den. In that case, however, the trial court
dismissed the robbery charge on its own
volition. That is not the case here.
The District Attorney's office, an arm
of the state, and under the direct supervision of the Attorney General (67-5-1),
that is appealing here,—a somewhat unorthodox and inconsistent circumstance,—
made the motion to dismiss the action,
which at that point was as much an issue
as Combs' restraint of liberty. It would
seem that before this court orders the
trial court to do much of anything the
matter of that motion to dismiss and the
resulting dismissal, all for a presumably
good cause, should be resolved.
In addition to the position I take on the
aspect of this case reflected in the paragraph immediately above, I urge that perhaps we made a mistake in the remand
portion of the McGuffey case and that we
should overrule that part of it. The instant case itself seems to point up the advisability of so doing. To do anything
more could lead us on safari in a civil
proceeding down a road into an erstwhile
juristic jungle of no return.

O
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Charles BUGGER, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 12278.

Supreme Court of Utah.
April 6, 1971.

Defendant was convicted in the Second
District Court, Davis County, Thornley K.
Swan, J., of being in actual physical control of his vehicle while under influence
of intoxicating liquor, and he appealed.
The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., held that
defendant who was asleep in his automobile which was completely off traveled por-

tion of highway and whose motor was not
running at time investigating officer
awakened defendant and detected smell of
alcohol was not in "actual physical control
of any vehicle" in violation of statute
proscribing such behavior at time of his
arrest.
Reversed.
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion.

Automobiles <§=*332
Defendant who was asleep in his automobile which was completely off traveled
portion of highway and whose motor was
not running at time investigating officer
awakened defendant and detected smell of
alcohol was not in "actual physical control
of any vehicle', in violation of statute
proscribing such behavior at time of his
arrest. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

Robert Van Sciver, Van Sciver, Florence, Hutchison & Sharp, Salt Lake City,
for defendant-appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Lauren
N. Beasley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff-respondent.
TUCKETT, Justice:
The defendant was found guilty of a
violation of Section 41-6-44, U.C.A.1953,
and from that conviction he has appealed
to this court.
During the night of July 28, 1969, the
defendant was asleep in his automobile
which was parked upon the shoulder of a
road known as Tippet's Lane in Davis
County. The automobile was completely
off the traveled portion of the highway
and the motor was not running. An officer
of the Highway Patrol stopped at the scene
and discovered the defendant was asleepWith some effort the officer succeeded »*|
awakening the defendant, at which time tWj
officer detected the smell of alcohol an"

s i A i x i v. jauuvrxaxw
uian
£43
Cite as 483 P.2d 442
arrested the defendant for being in actual he was attempting to brake the vehicle to
cySical control of the vehicle while under
arrest its motion.
^e influence of intoxicating liquor.
We are of the opinion that the facts in
The complaint charges the defendant this case do not make out a violation of
the statute and the defendant's conviction
with the violation of the statute above reis reversed. We do not consider ft necesferred to which provides as follows:
sary to discuss the other claimed errors
It is unlawful and punishable as proraised by the defendant.
vided in subsection (d) of this section
for any person who is under the influCALLISTER, C. J., and HENRIOD
ence of intoxicating liquor to drive or be
and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
in actual physical control of any vehicle
within this state.
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting).
The defendant is here challenging the
I dissent.
validity of the statute on the grounds of
The statute formerly made it unlawful
vagueness. However, we need not decide
for a person under the influence of intoxithe case upon that ground. QThat part of
cating liquor to drive any vehicle upon any
the statute which states: "be in actual physhighway within this state. 1 The amendment
ical control of any vehicle" has been beadded a provision making it unlawful to
fore the courts of other jurisdictions which
be in actual physical control of a vehicle
have statutes with similar wordings. The
while under the influence of intoxicating
word "actual" has been defined as meanliquor. It removed the need to be upon a
ing "existing in act or reality; * * * in
highway before the crime was made out
action or existence at the time being;
and did away with the necessity of driving
present; * * *." The word "physical"
before
a crime was committed.
is defined as "bodily," and "control" is deThe
reason for the change is obvious.
fined as "to exercise restraining or directIt
is
better
to prevent an intoxicated person
ing influence over; to dominate; regulate;
in
charge
of
an automobile from getting
hence, to hold from actions; to curb."
The term in "actual physical control" in on the highway than it is to punish him
after he gets on it. The amended statute
its ordinary sense means "existing" or
gives officers a right to arrest a drunk
"present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation." £J It is person in the control of an automobile and
clear that in the record before us the facts thus prevent him from wreaking havoc
do not bring the case within the wording a minute later by getting in traffic, or from
injuring himself by his erratic driving.
of the statute. The defendant at the time
of his arrest was not controlling the veIt does not matter whether the motor
hicle, nor was he exercising any dominion
is running or is idle nor whether the drank
over it. It is noted that the cases cited by
is in the front seat or in the back seat.
the plaintiff in support of its position in
His potentiality for harm is lessened but
this matter deal with entirely different fact
not obviated by a silent motor or a backsituations, such as the case where the driver
seat position—provided, of course, that he
was seated in his vehicle on the traveled
is the one in control of the car. It only
portion of the highway; or where the motakes a flick of the wrist to start the motor
tor of the vehicle was operating; or where
or to engage the gears, and it requires only
the driver was attempting to steer the autoa moment of time to get under the wheel
mobile while it was in motion; or where
from the back seat. A drunk in control
I. State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d
338; State v. Ruona, 133 Moat. 243,
321 P.2d 615; Ohio v. Wilgus, Com.PL,

17 Ohio Supp. 34; Parker v. State (Okl.
Cr.App.), 424 P.2d 997 ; 47 A.L.R.2d 582.
I. Sec. 57-7-14, R.S.U.1933.
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of a motor vehicle has such a propensity
to cause harm that the statute intended to
make it criminal for him to be in a position
to do so.
Restraining the movement of a vehicle
is controlling it as much as moving it is.
A person finding a drunk in the back seat
of a car parked in one's driveway is likely
to learn who is in control of that car if
he should attempt to move it. A drunk
may maliciously block one's exit, and in
doing so he is in control of his own vehicle.
I think the defendant in this case was in
control of his truck within the meaning of
the statute even though he may have been
asleep. He had the key and was the only
one who could drive it. The fact that he
chose to park it is no reason to say he was
not in control thereof.
I, therefore, think that we should consider the question which he raises in his
brief as to the validity of the statute.
Cases wherein an attack was made on
statutes like ours have been decided in a
number of jurisdictions. They hold the
statute good.
In the case of State v. Webb, 78 Ariz.
8, 274 P.2d 338 (1954), the defendant was
intoxicated and asleep in a truck parked
next to some barricades in a lane of traffic. An officer passed by and observed
no one in the car. Later he returned and
found the defendant "passed out." The
statute made it a crime to be in actual
physical control of a car while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. The defendant contended that the wording of the
statute was not meant to apply to a situation where the car was parked and that it
was only concerned with the driving of an
automobile and other acts and conduct of a
positive nature. In holding that the statute
was applicable to the conduct of the defendant, the court said:
An intoxicated person seated behind
the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is
a threat to the safety and welfare of
the public. The danger is less than that

In the case of Parker v. State, 424 P.2d
997 (Okl.Cr.App.1967), the appellant challenged the constitutionality of a statute
making it unlawful for "any person who is
under the influence of intoxicating liquor
to drive, operate, or be in actual physical
control of any motor vehicle within this
state." There the defendant (appellant)
claimed that the statute was unconstitutional in that it was so vague and indefinite
that a person charged thereunder would be
deprived of due process of law. The court
held that the statute did not violate any
of appellant's constitutional rights.
Under a similar statute the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Ruona, 133 Mont.
243, 321 P.2d 615 (1958), held that the
statute was not void for vagueness, and in
doing so said:
* * * Thus one could have "actual
physical control" while merely parking
or standing still so long as one was
keeping the car in restraint or in position to regulate its movements. Preventing a car from moving is as much control
and dominion as actually putting the car
in motion on the highway. Could one
exercise any more regulation over a
thing, while bodily present, than prevention of movement or curbing movement.
As long as one were physically or bodily
able to assert dominion, in the sense of
movement, then he has as much control
over an object as he would if he were
actually driving the vehicle.
*
*
*
*
*
*
* * * [I]t is quite evident that the
statute in the instant case is neither
vague nor uncertain. * * *
The appellant here claims some federally
protected rights in that he says he was improperly arrested. It is difficult for me to
see where that has anything to do with
guilt or innocence. If he were improperly
arrested, he would have an action against
the officer for false arrest, but surely our
courts have not lost contact with reality
to the extent that we turn a guilty man
«

<n_

^^

«^„efoKU

maV

Cite as 4

From w n a t n a s b e e n s a , c i a l ) 0 v e ' t n c r e
• bsolutcly no merit to this claim. By
1
• * in control of an automobile while
iL,der the influence of intoxicating liquor,
FT defendant was guilty of a misdemeanor
Fhich was in the presence of the officer,
l v d the officer had a right and a duty to
k'rrest him.2
i?-The defendant was found guilty in the
fxourt below of being in actual physical
''control of his truck while he was under
•'the influence of intoxicating liquor. He
?does not dispute that he was drunk. If the
^statute is good, we should not attempt to
Overrule the trier of the facts and find
Ifthat the defendant was not the one actuall y controlling his truck.
'Y\ would affirm the judgment of the trial
-court.

P.2d 445

1. Insurance €=>452
Person on foot does not cease to be
"pedestrian" within policy covering injuries sustained while a pedestrian merely
because he is not in motion.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Insurance <§=3452
Where farmer was working about
idling farm tractor located on his private
property and it rolled forward and crushed
him, he was "pedestrian" within policy
covering injury "sustained in consequence
of being struck by any land conveyance
while a pedestrian."

Thomas S. Taylor, of Christensen, Taylor & Moody, Provo, for defendant-appellant.
Tex R. Olsen, of Olsen & Chamberlain,
Richfield, for plaintiff-respondent.
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HENRIOD, Justice:

Irene A. PETERSON, Plaintiff

and Respondent,
v.
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, a

corporation, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 12187.

Supreme Court of Utah.
March 29, 1971.

Appeal by insurer from judgment of
the Sixth District Court, Sevier County,
Ferdinand Erickson, J., holding that deceased was covered by accident policy.
:The Supreme Court, Henriod, J., held that
where farmer was working about idling
farm tractor located on his private property and it rolled forward and crushed him,
he was "pedestrian'* within policy covering
injury "sustained in consequence of being
struck by any land conveyance while a pedestrian."
Affirmed.
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion.

Appeal from what was labeled a summary judgment for plaintiff which actually
was a judgment on all available facts, under an insurance policy covering injury
"sustained in consequence of being struck
by any land conveyance while a pedestrian." Affirmed, with costs to plaintiff.
Believable evidence elicited under the
discovery process indicates that plaintiffs
farmer husband was crushed by a tractor
that, driverless, had rolled down a rise, all
of which occurred on his private property.
The only question is whether the deceased was a "pedestrian', under the terms
of the policy. The trial court said he was,
—a conclusion with which we agree,—no
one questioning the fact that the tractor
was a "land conveyance," and it appearing
that the vehicle, out of gear, simply traveled downhill as mentioned, and quite obviously ran over the deceased.
[1,2] Appellant indulges a non sequitur
by assuming that coverage under the policy

2. Sec. 77-13-3(1), U.C.A.1953.

582

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

[April

1930]

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

583

Truitt v. Patten, Sheriff, 75 Utah 567

Appeal from Third District

586; Lusch v. Huber Mfg. Co., 79 Neb. 45, 112 N. W. 284;
Harvey v. Morse, 69 N. H. 475, 45 A. 239; Van Schaick v.
Ramsey, 90 Hun, 550, 35 N. Y. S. 1006; Woods V. Nichols,
22 R. I. 225, 47 A. 211; Woods V. Nichols, 21 R. I. 537, 45
A. 548, 48 L. R. A. 773; Benjamin Schivarz & Sons v. Kennedy (C. C.) 142 F. 1027; Moore et al. v. Carey Bros. Oil
Co. et al. (Tex. Com. App.) 269 S. W. 75, 39 A. L. R. 1247;
Alder V. Chapman, 91 Okl. 196, 219 P. 90.
Under the judgment rendered in this case plaintiff will
receive the same amount of damages that he would have
received if he had been the absolute owner of the automobile. Clearly plaintiff was not damaged as much because
he was deprived of his special property right in the automobile as he would have been if he had been the absolute
owner thereof. Carlson, according to plaintiff's testimony,
always had a right to the automobile when he paid the remainder of the purchase price. If Carlson always had such
a right I can see no escape from the conclusion that he also
has a right to the proceeds derived from the sale of the
automobile after plaintiff is paid the amount owing to him.
If Carlson had such a right, it passed to the defendant by
virtue of the attachment and sale, and plaintiff has no just
ground to complain so long as he received the amount owing
to him. An attaching creditor of the interest of a buyer
to purchase property under a conditional sales contract cannot well be said to be a stranger to the title because such
attaching creditor acquires, by the attachment sale, the
title theretofore held by the debtor. If plaintiff had, before
commencing his action, demanded payment of the money
owing him and declared a forfeiture of Carlson's interest
in the automobile because of nonpayment of such money,
an entirely different situation would have been presented.
The cases of Meister & Sons Co. V. Harrison, 56 Cal. App.
679, 206 P. 106; Duncan v. Stone, 45 Vt. 118, cited in the
prevailing opinion, are readily distinguishable from the
facts in this case. In both cases the buyer was in default.
Here, as already indicated, plaintiff extended the time of

payment of the balance of the purchase price, and therefore
he cannot rescind "until full notice and a reasonable time
for performance is given." Plaintiff does not claim that
any demand was made for the payment of the balance of
the purchase price, or that Carlson's interest in the automobile was ever forfeited.
I am thus of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted.
STRAUP, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion.

STATE v. OLSON.
No. 4902. Decided April 24, 1930.

(287 P. 181.)

1. EMBEZZLEMENT—BANK—GENERAL SHORTAGE?—EVIDENCE!—ADMIS-

SIBILITY. In prosecution for embezzlement by bank cashier of particular sum, evidence of large general shortage was admissible.
Accused had been taking funds from the bank for a period
up to ten years, and admitted the taking, and accountants
employed by bank who went over the account found a large
shortage. Accused was prosecuted for a single transaction,
but district attorney in opening statement told jury that
there was a large shortage and the bank examiners and expert accountants were permitted to testify to such shortage;
also testimony of accused's admission of such shortage was
admitted into evidence.
2.

EMBEZZLEMENT—SHORTAGE IN BANK—BAD

LOANS—PROOF.

In

prosecution for embezzlement, evidence held not to show shortage
of bank's funds was due to bad loans.
3.

EMBEZZLEMENT—EMBEZZLEMENT PROSECUTION — PRESUMPTION
LOANS BY BANK—REPRESENTED BY ASSETS. In absence of con-

tradictory evidence in prosecution of bank cashier for embezzlement, court assumed that every loan of bank would be represented
by corresponding asset.
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4.

CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—ADMISSIBILITY.

counsel had offered to produce any books which accused
might require in order to carry on the case.

Evidence reasonably

tending to establish facts sought to be proved is relevant and
admissible unless forbidden by some rule of evidence.
5.

11.

Counsel for state failed to develop just how witness was
able to ascertain such facts from the books, records, and accounts of the bank, so judge might determine as a matter
of law whether there was any competent probative value to
the conclusion of the expert witness.

EMBEZZLEMENT—EVIDENCE—GENERAL SHORTAGE—PROVING PAR-

TICULAR TAKING. A S regards admissibility of evidence, general
shortage in cash account of bank would tend materially to establish embezzlement of particular sum.
7.

EMBEZZLEMENT—GENERAL SHORTAGE—EVIDENCE—ADMISSIBILITY.

General shortage over two years subsequent to alleged embezzlement, where shortage had been continuing for ten years, was
admissible as tending to prove particular embezzlement.
8.

CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—ADMISSIBILITY—EXPERT TESTIMONY

—EXAMINATION OF ACCOUNT BOOKS.

Expert accountants could

testify to results of examination of bank's books in prosecution of
cashier for embezzlement, where records were numerous and
voluminous.
The books were such that they could not be satisfactorily
or conveniently examined in court. The expert witnesses were
accountants who employed their time exclusively in examining books and records of bank and business institutions.
10.

12.

CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—PRODUCTION OF BOOKS—FAILURE TO

DEMAND. Accused cashier, in prosecution for embezzlement, could
not complain bank's books, to examination of which experts testified, were not in court when he did not ask for them.
Accused made definite request to neither court nor prosecuting counsel for production of bank's books. Prosecuting
Corpus Juris-Cyc. References:
Criminal Law 16 C. J. § 1034 p. 543 n. 37; § 1211 p. 615 n. 66;
§ 2180 p. 865 n. 91; 17 C. J. § 3674 p. 331 n. 46.
Embezzlement 20 C. J. § 79 p. 482 n. 39; § 82 p. 486 n. 60.

CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—CONCLUSION—EXPERT—ADMISSIBIL-

ITY. In prosecution of cashier for embezzlement, testimony of
expert about shortage as reflected by accused's checking account
held objectionable as calling for conclusion; witness not stating
how he arrived at figures.

CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—ADMISSIONS—CORPUS DELICTI—OR-

DER OF PROOF. In prosecution for embezzlement, admission in evidence of admissions made by accused concerning shortage before
corpus delicti had been established, was not error, where corpus
delicti was established later by other evidence.
9.

CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—EXPERT—CONCLUSION—ADMISSIBIL-

ITY. In prosecution of cashier for embezzlement, question to expert whether shortage was reflected in checking account of accused held objectionable, where not followed by fact on which
witness based conclusion.

EMBEZZLEMENT—BANK FUNDS—EMBEZZLEMENT OF PART—EVI-

DENCE. In prosecution of bank cashier for embezzlement, it was
sufficient to show that, out of gross sum of money received for
bank by accused, he embezzled a portion.
6.

585

13.

CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—CONCLUSIONS—HARMLESS ERROR,

In

proseution of bank cashier for embezzlement, conclusions, connecting accused with general shortage, of expert accountant without telling basis, held harmless error; connection having been established beyond reasonable doubt by admissions of accused.

Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake
County; O. W. McConkie, Judge.
Leon L. Olson was convicted of embezzlement, and he
appeals.
AFFIRMED.

George P. Parker, Attorney General, and L. A. Miner,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
F. W. James and J. Louis Brown, both of Salt Lake City,
for appellant.
EPHRAIM HANSON, J.
Defendant was convicted of embezzlement. The information charged that he was the agent and employee of the
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Midvale State Bank and as such fraudulently appropriatei
to his own use the sum of $1,000 on January 2, 1926, whicl
came into his possession and under his control by virtu
of his employment. From the conviction and the judgmen
imposed upon him, he has appealed to this court.
A brief statement of the facts will aid in understanding
the questions presented by the assignment of errors.
The accused was cashier of the bank. He had held sue?
position from the organization of the bank, approximate!)
eighteen years. A. L. Anderson was assistant cashier, and
had been such for a great many years. The record does
not disclose what other, if any, employees were regularly
engaged in the bank. The defendant as cashier, had complete charge of the bank and its funds. The other employees
were under his direction and supervision. There was an
auditing committee, consisting of three of the directors,
and this committee examined the books once each three
months. On March 25, 1928, while this committee was in
course of making one of its regular examinations of the
books, the defendant told E. L. Burgon, a member of the
committee, that, when the committee came to the checking
accounts, it would find a $25,000 shortage. This was the
first knowledge or initmation Mr. Burgon had of a shorttage in the bank, although he had been a director for eighteen years and a member of the auditing committee for
more than five years. It seems clear that it was the first
knowledge that had come to any of the directors of the
bank that there was any shortage. This examination was
made Sunday, March 25, 1928. The examination made at
this time did not disclose any material shortage in the savings accounts, but, owing to the disclosure of the shortage
in the checking accounts made by the defendant and as
verified by the examination of the auditing committee, a
special meeting was held Monday morning at the bank at
which W. S. Chipman, president of the bank, John A. Aylett
and Joseph M. Holt, two of the directors, Walter H. Hadlock and Herbert Taylor, two bank examiners from the

office of the state bank examiner, and defendant were
present. Before the others had arrived at the bank, Mr.
Holt asked defendant what the meeting was for. Defendant
replied that there was "something wrong" in the bank. For
a statement of what occurred, and as to what was said at
the time and place, we here quote from the testimony of W.
S. Chipman given at the trial and as preserved in the bill
of exceptions :
"I asked Mr. Olson what was wrong:, and he told me that they had
i shortage of $25,000.00 in their individual accounts; and I asked
lim how long it had been going on and he said upward of ten years.
* * * I asked him how he had been able to get by the bank examiners
.11 this while and he told me it was through the manipulation of loose
saves; that when the bank examiners would come he would remove
nough sheets to aggregate the $25,000.00. * * * I asked him who
ssisted him in working these books and covering up the shortage.
fe told me he was alone, he had no assistants, he had done it him»lf. * * * I asked Mr. Olson how the savings accounts were and he
•Id me they were all right, and I called in the assistant, Mr. Anderson.
* * I called Mr. Anderson in and asked him if he did not assist
r. Olson in the manipulation of these accounts to deceive the bank
aminers and he said he did. I asked him if there was any other
ortage in the bank and he said that there was a shortage in the
vings accounts, more than there was in the individual accounts, and
estimated the shortage to be upwards of $40,000.00 * * * I asked
:. Anderson how they manipulated these accounts and he told me
;se individual accounts, they removed the leaves when there was
examination. * * * Mr. Olson stated that he did not think the
>rtage should be over $33,000.00. Mr. Anderson put it a great deal
her than that all the time."

)n cross-examination, Mr. Chipman said that he thought
. Anderson stated to him that the shortage started when
bank made a "poor loan" to the Childers Leasing Comin examination of the books and records was then made
the bank examiners, Hadlock and Taylor, in which all
>ent, including the defendant, assisted. With reference
he savings accounts, they took each individual annw~*
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as shown in the ledger of those accounts and made a list on
an adding machine and checked it against the amounts
apportioned to the savings account by the general ledger
or control account. The same method was followed with
reference to the checking accounts and also the notes. It
was thus found that the savings account as shown by the
individual ledger were $29,964.01 in excess of the control
account; that the total of the "checking accounts exceeded
the amounts apportioned to such accounts by the control
account by over $25,000; that in the notes there were
$8,242.50 less than was shown by the loans and discount
account. With these figures before them, Mr. Taylor asked
the defendant <fif there was any further shortage in any
way." The defendant then stated that "an examination of
some of the pass books would reveal a further difference of
upwards of $10,000 additional shortage," and made special
reference to Mrs. D. A. Drown's account. Mr. Burgon, who
had not been present during the morning, came to the bank
shortly after the noon hour and had a conference with the
defendant and Mr. Anderson. Mr. Burgon asked defendant
why he had not told him about the shortage in the savings
accounts on Sunday, and either defendant or Anderson
(witness did not remember which, but said one or the other)
answered and said, "We didn't want to break the news all
at one time; we wanted the officials of the bank to get a
part of the information/' and "thought it would be easier
that way."
Defendant was removed from duty at the bank, and on
the second day following, namely, March 28th, Mr. Hadlock
and Mr. Taylor closed the bank for business. The record
does not disclose how long the bank was closed, but Mr.
Taylor was in control for two months and until the directors and stockholders had paid dollar for dollar of all accounts. The state bank commissioner employed an auditing
company to make an audit of the books and records of the
bank. The actual work of the audit, was done by Mr.
Guiver. Mr. Guiver testified that he spent forty-five days

in making the audit and preparing his report; that he made
a complete audit of the bank's condition for 1928, and went
back over the books for 1927 and on certain accounts he
went back several years. He testified that he found a shortage of $88,652.45 as of Saturday March 24, 1928. Of this
amount $54,694.45 was in the savings accounts, $25,305.50
was in the checking accounts, and $8,242.50 was in the
notes. The witness also testified that he was able to trace
certain credits, amounting to the sum of $1,330, as shown
by the passbook of Mrs. Drown, should have been posted to
her savings account, but which was deflected instead to the
credit of the defendant's account. This consisted mainly of
$35 monthly deposits made by Mrs. Drown beginning with
October, 1924, and then continued to almost the end of the
account.
On the state's offer, there were received in evidence the
bank's ledger of the savings account of Mrs. Drown, consisting of ledger leaves marked as Exhibits A and B, also
her passbook, marked as Exhibit C. On Exhibit B is shown
a debit entry or charge of $1,000 as of January 2, 1926. It
is to this transaction that the prosecution anchors its case.
It is admitted by counsel for defendant that Exhibit C is
Mrs. Drown's passbook, and that the $1,000 was not drawn
out of the bank by Mrs. Drown or at her instance and request. The amount of Mrs. Drown's account as of January
2,1926, as shown by her passbook, was $8,960. The amount
as shown by the bank's ledger of this account as of that
date is $2,201.28, making a difference of $6,763.72 that her
account was short. The shortage of this account as of
March 24, 1928, was $9,580.04, and this amount was reflected in the general shortage of the bank. Mr. Taylor
testified that this particular entry appeared to be in Mr.
Anderson's handwriting. He also testified that a number
of the entries appeared to be in defendant's handwriting.
It is shown that, in computing interest on a savings account, the practice followed by banks generally is to compute the interest on the amount shown by the bank ledger,
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and that the figures representing the interest would be
copied from the ledger to the depositor's passbook. In this
case, for the purpose of the bank's record, the interest was
computed according to the amount sho\wi by the bank's
ledger and for Mrs. Drown the interest was computed according to the amount shown by her passbook.
The first ground of complaint relates to the shortage and
the manner in which the term was employed during the
trial. The appellant complains because, in his opening statement, the district attorney told the jury the state
would show that there was a shortage of $88,152.45
1-3
of the funds of the bank on March 24, 1928, that the
bank examiners and expert accountant were permitted to
testify to such shortage, and that a number of witnesses
were permitted to testify concerning statements and admissions made by the accused as to the existence of the shortage at the meeting held at the bank Monday March 26,
1928. The appellant gives as his reason for this contention
that it was never "clearly shown that these shortages were
caused by money" or other assets "leaving the bank"
through appellant's fraudulent conduct "or simply by poor
loans that were charged off." Appellant further asserts
that "not one of the auditors wanted to testify as to just
what was meant by shortage." This contention does not
correctly reflect the record in that connection. As cashier
of the bank, appellant was undoubtedly thoroughly familiar
with any transaction where a bad loan had been accounted
for as a shortage rather than, as is usual, to charge the
same off as a loss. Yet in his brief he has directed our
attention to but two instances where he claims that such
was done. In the first instance he refers to the loan to
Childers Leasing Company. There is not a word of evidence in the record as to what this transaction was or how
it was disposed of except reference is made to it as a "poor
loan" by counsel for appellant in his cross-examination of
Mr. Chipman. Counsel asked, "They told you the shortage
started when they made that poor loan?" The witness

answered, "I think that Mr. Anderson did." In this question
and answer we have all that the record discloses concerning
this transaction, yet much of appellant's briefs are devoted
to it. Appellant never once asserted that the shortage he
was talking about in his conversations with the board of
directors of the bank and the bank examiners at the meeting March 24, 1928, was occasioned, wholly or in part by
losses which were caused or sustained by "poor loans." He
designated the situation as "something wrong" and something to be concealed from the bank examiners and directors. Even though we assume that defendant would be
entitled to any exculpatory statements made by Anderson in
connection with the admission or statement made by the
latter in connection with his admission or statement that
ie had assisted the defendant to manipulate the books to
prevent detection of their "wrongs," the statement made by
Anderson dees not justify the inference that the loan, if
;here were a loan, entered into or became a part of the
shortage. It rather fixes the circumstance or transaction
:o-ordinate in point of time with the inception or beginning
>f the shortage. Were it a loan, even though a poor one,
here would unmistakably be a corresponding asset in the
orm of a promissory note or other obligation to pay. At
east such is what we have to assume in the absence of
urther information concerning the matter. It should be
:ept in mind that, whatever was the result of the alleged
ransaction, it was more than ten years before the audit
fas made by Mr. Guiver.
Our attention is also directed to what counsel for apellant has called the Steadman note for $3,000 face value,
igned by Mr. Steadman and two of his sons. Mr. Guiver
tated that when he made the audit all three signers were
ailed in, and that they denied having signed the note, and
lid that their signatures thereto were forgeries. Upon
le assumption that it was a forged instrument, the note
as not treated by Guiver in his audit as an asset, as it
ould have been had the signatures been genuine. It is

592

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

[April

1930]

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

593

State v. Olson, 75 Utah 583

Appeal from Third District

obvious that in so treating the note the shortage was increased proportionately. There is no evidence in the record
to show that the signatures to the note are genuine. Mr.
Guiver, however, testified on cross-examination that he had
heard since he made the audit that the signers of the note
had acknowledged their signatures to the note as being
genuine. In the event that the signatures are genuine, the
only result would be that the shortage would be reduced in
the amount of the note.
In reference to the statement of appellant that "no one
of the auditors wanted to testify as to just what was meant
by shortage," the answer of the witness to whom the direct
question was put as to what they meant when they employed the term or used the words "shortage" in their testimony may be of material assistance in determining this
phase of the question. Mr. Burgon, testifying of the shortage in the savings accounts as shown on Monday February
26, 1928, in answer to a direct question put to him by appellant's attorney, said: "The bank ledger showed more
than the control account by $33,000.00. That is, the savings
ledger showed that much more than the control ledger had
apportioned to the savings account. * * * The control account had to be correct because that represented the amount
of money that we had." Mr. Taylor, in stating what he
meant by shortage, said: "I mean that either the assets
as shown by the (bank) statement are not all accounted for
or the liabilities are greater than the liabilities accounted
for". "But," asked counsel for appellant, "that does not
mean that any of the officials of the bank got the money?"
To this the witness answered: "It means that somebody
got it." Upon further cross-examination, the witness stated
he did not know what made up the shortage, but he knew
it was not poor loans, as they would not have been shown
in that way. It could only mean that the proper credits
were not shown or the proper assets were not accounted
for. Mr. Hadlock, the state bank examiner, after testifying as to the respective amounts of the shortages in the

checking accounts, the savings accounts and the notes, and
how himself and those he had helping him had arrived at
these amounts, said that when he referred to such "shortages" he meant the difference between the liabilities as
reflected in the individual checking accounts, individual
savings accounts, and the assets as shown by the notes compared with the control total of the bank's statement in
reference to those same accounts, and, when the liabilities
as shown in the checking accounts and savings accounts
exceeded the amount apportioned to those accounts in the
control account and the assets represented by the notes
were less than those represented in the control account,
there was a diminution of the assets of the bank to the extent of the difference in those various accounts.
It is certain from the record before us that there was a
very considerable shortage, competent and uncontradicted
evidence showing the amount to be $88,152.15. It is equally
certain from the record that the shortage was not made up,
either in whole or in part, by losses due to poor loans, with
the possible exception of what has been designated the
Steadman note, which, as we have seen, was treated as a
forged note. It may not improperly be here stated that the
losses arising from poor loans should not, under any known
system of bookkeeping, affect the amounts due the individual depositors so as to reflect a shortage in their individual
accounts with the bank such as was done in Mrs. Drown's
account. This could not arise except by the clearest and
most open kind of pilfering by some one.
Evidence that reasonably tends to establish the facts
sought to be proved is relevant and is admissible unless forbidden by some one of the exclusionary rules of evidence.
Counsel for appellant have not called our attention
to any rule or principle excluding the fact that there
4-6
is such a shortage, and there is none which presents
itself to our minds. The bank does not keep the money
which it receives from its depositors in separate individual
21
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funds corresponding with the depositors. It is all mingled
together in one account. It is not necessary to allege or
prove from whom the defendant, as the agent of the bank,
received the money which is the subject of the embezzlement. It is sufficient to show that out of the gross sum
of money received by him as such he has embezzled a portion. It would seem that there could be no doubt but that
a general shortage or deficiency in the cash account of the
bank would tend very materially to establish such a case.
State v. Meeker, 72 N. J. Law, 210, 61 A. 381; People V.
Maljan, 34 Cal. App. 384, 167 P. 547; State V. Hasledahl,
3 N. D. 36, 53 N. W. 430.
Appellant also complains of the remoteness of the shortage which was shown, and contends that "the fact of a
general shortage two years and three months subsequent
to the alleged embezzlement of $1,000.00 is no evidence at
all of the commission of that crime and is highly
prejudicial." There is no merit to appellant's con7
tention in this regard. By his own admission the
shortage began back ten years before, and approximately
eight years before the offense charged in the information
was committed. From the evidence in the case, it seems
certain that the amount of the shortage grew constantly
larger with each succeeding year. It is conclusively established that on January 2, 1926, Mrs. Drown's account, as
we have already stated in this opinion, was short $6,763.72,
and by March 24, 1928, the shortage in that account had
increased to $9,589.04 and was reflected in the general
shortage.
It is also urged that the trial court erred in admitting
over objection evidence of the statements and admissions
made by defendant concerning the shortage and the means
resorted to by him to escape detection by the state bank
examiner before the corpus delicti had been established. Ordinarily, when the state seeks to introduce
8
evidence of extrajudicial statements or admissions of

the defendant connecting him with the commission of the
crime charged, the corpus delicti should be first proved.
But, inasmuch as the order of proof is largely within the
discretion of the trial court, it is not error, in the absence
of a showing that the defendant will be prejudiced thereby,
to permit evidence of statements and admissions of the defendant implicating him with the crime charged before the
existence of the corpus delicti is established, if, as was done
in this case, the corpus delicti was subsequently proved.
People V. Barnnovich, 16 Cal. App. 427, 117 P. 572; People
v. Svjaile, 12 Cal. App. 192, 107 P. 134; People v. Wagner,
29 Cal. App. 363, 155 P. 649; State V. James, 96 N. J. Law,
132, 114 A. 553, 16 A. L. R. 1141; People v. Saunders, 13
Cal. 743, 110 P. 825; 16 C. J. p. 865, § 2180; Id. p. 737, §
1514, subheading "Order of Proof." Certainly in the
present case the corpus delicti was established beyond a
reasonable doubt by evidence aside from and independent
of the statements and admissions of the accused. The testimony of the bank examiners and the auditor showed the
shortage existing in three different funds of the bank.
Their testimony showed that credits which should have
been posted to Mrs. Drowns ledger account were deflected
to the defendant's individual account; that her ledger account had been falsified by unauthorized debit charges and
by omitting to post credits therein which should have been
posted. Daily reports were also falsified by making the
loans and discounts show an excess over the actual amount
of notes in the bank, and the individual checking and savings accounts shown by such statements were less by many
thousands of dollars than the liabilities as actually reflected
in the individual ledger accounts. In all of this there is not
a single feature that can be accounted for on any reasonable
hypothesis of innocence.
Over defendant's objection to the effect that the questions
called for conclusions of the witnesses and that the books
were the best evidence, the court permitted each of the bank
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examiners. Mr. Taylor and Mr. Hadlock, and also
Mr. Guiver, the accountant, to give the results of
9
their examinations of the books and records of the
Midvale State Bank bearing upon the shortages in various
funds of the bank and also the shortage in the savings account of Mrs. Drown. These rulings are made the subject
of a considerable number of assignments. We find no error
in the court's rulings here complained of. The witnesses
were all expert accountants, and employed their time exclusively in examining books and records of banks and other
business institutions. Their conclusions were based entirely
on the books and records of the bank as they had found
them upon their examination of them. It is well settled
that where the original evidence consists of books of account, records, and papers which might properly be used
in evidence are numerous and voluminous and cannot be
satisfactorily or conveniently examined in court, it is competent for any qualified person who has examined them to
testify as to the result of such examination with regard to
the subject under investigation. Cleveland, C, C. & St. L.
Ry Co. v. Woodbury Glass Co. (Ind. App.) 120 N. E. 426,
page 433; People v. Moone, 334 111. 590, 166 N. E. 481, page
487; 2 Wigmore, Ev., § 1230 (first and second edition); 16
C. J. p. 615, § 1211; 22 C. J. p. 1017, § 1303; People v. Sawhill, 299 111. 393, 132 N. E. 477.
Counsel for appellant further insist that there were no
books of record in court and that appellant was entitled to
have them there for the reason that there was no showing
made that the books could not have been produced in
court. The record shows that there were received in
10
evidence the ledger account of Mrs. Drown's savings
account, her passbook, the daily cash statement of the bank,
eight reports or statements of the condition of the bank,
several sheets of the daily blotter, and that at the conclusion
of the direct examination of Mr. Hadlock, Mr. Moyle special
counsel for the state said to counsel for defendant, "I will
say we will produce any record counsel may desire," to
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which there was no response of any kind. Subsequently,
at the request of defendant's counsel, there were brought
into court a large number of paid checks of Leon L. Olson,
the defendant, and also paid checks of the Tenabo Mining
Company and a teller's blotter for January 5, 1926. In
answer to questions put to him by appellant's attorney, Mr.
Guiver stated that he did not have all of the books in court
that he had used in making the audit; that he did have,
however, all those supporting his claim of shortage and all
those which tended to show and by which he was enabled
to allocate portions of the general shortage that reflected
themselves in the checking account of Leon L. Olson and
Olson Bros., Incorporated. Appellant does not complain
because the books were not introduced in evidence, but only
because they were not present in court; yet the only case
referred to by him on the subject is State v. Paulson, 27 S.
D. 24, 129 N. W. 558, where the statement is made that,
"in cases wherein examination and compensation may be
shown, the rules of evidence require the records themselves
to be offered in connection therewith." On the question as
to whether the original books and papers must be introduced in evidence in connection with the testimony of an
expert accountant or other competent person in giving the
result of his examination thereof, there seems to be some
conflict of opinion among the authorities. Prof. Wigmore,
in speaking on this question, says: "Most courts require,
as a condition, that the mass thus summarily testified to
shall, if the occasion seem to require it, be placed at hand
in court, or at least be made accessible to the opposing
party; in order that the correctness of the evidence may be
tested by inspection if desired, or that the material for
cross-examination may be available." 2 Wigmore, Ev. (2d
Ed.) § 1230. See, also, 16 C. J. p. 617, § 1211. Sound reason dictates and the authorities hold that, if the books are
accessible and can be brought into court, opposing counsel
should have every reasonable opportunity to examine them
and to use them on cross-examination so that he may ascer-
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tain the correctness of the conclusion of the person, testifying as to the result of his examination of the originals.
There is no reason why this may not be done if the books
are present in court or are otherwise satisfactorily made
available to opposing counsel without having them all introduced in evidence in the first instance. Furthermore,
if all the books and records are not present in court, or are
not satisfactorily made available to opposing counsel, they
may be brought into court or be otherwise made available
to opposing counsel by a proper application to the court for
an order requiring that that be done. As we read the adjudicated cases, such seems to be the prevailing practice
where all the records are not already before the court.
People v. Moone, supra; Inter-State Finance Corp. v. Commercial Jewelry Co., 280 111. 116, 117 N. E. 440; Elmira
Roofing Co. V. Gould, 71 Conn. 629, 42 A. 1002.
As the situation is presented by the record in the present
case, it appears that all of the books which were examined
by Mr. Guiver, the auditor, were not present in the courtroom. As hereinbefore stated, in addition to the books,
statements, and accounts received in evidence and Mr.
Moyle's proffer to produce any record counsel might desire,
there were present in court all the books and records necessary to show the shortage and also those from which the
auditor said he was able to allocate portions of the shortage
to certain individual accounts. In such a situation, if the
appellant had desired any additional books and records, he
should have applied to the court to require the state to
produce them before he may be heard to complain that all
the books actually examined by the auditor were not present
in court. Instead of requesting the state's attorney for
such additional books or accounts as appellant might have
desired and in the event that such request was of no avail
applying to the court for an order requiring the state's
attorney to produce them, only this veiled request was made
by appellant of the witness Guiver near the end of the

cross-examination of that witness, as appears in the record
before us.
"Now, in the morning will you bring me all of the records you
used in making a compilation of your audi;? I want to cross-examine
you on that. A. All of the records I used?
Yes. A. May I ask Mr. Moyle (special counsel for the state)
a "Q.
question?
"No, he has got nothing to do with my cross-examination, ask
me? A. May I ask you how I can get some of the records from the
Mid vale State Bank?
"Q. If we could get them, we have no control over h.
know how I will get them."

A. I don't

Later, in reference to this same subject, the record shows
that this colloquy was had :
"The Court: I understood from the line of questioning you were
not expecting the witness to bring those books in.
"Mr. James (Counsel for defendant) : I differ from the Court's
ruling, if they are willing to stand on the way they present their
case I am.
"The Court:
brought
in—

The question of whether or not you want the books

"Mr. James: I will leave the burden to the state.
"The Court: You are not asking for them.
"Mr. James: I am making the suggestion that you get them."

In our opinion the foregoing was not sufficient request
upon the state's attorney to have other books or records
brought into court or otherwise made available to the defendant for this examination and use at the trial. Neither
was it, in the event of a refusal or a failure on the part of
the prosecution to produce them, a sufficient application to
the court for an order requiring the books and records
brought in. Therefore appellant may not at this time be
heard to complain because other or additional books which
he might have desired to use at the trial were not there.
The court has ample power and authority to have required
the prosecution to have the books that are accessible brought
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into court for the use of the defendant and undoubtedly
would have exercised its jurisdiction in this regard had it
been properly invoked by appellant.
Appellant's next contention goes to the extent to which
the experts were permitted to testify from their respective
examinations. Stating the contention in the langauge of
appellant's brief, it is this: The expert "was allowed
to testify * * * as to the amount and falsity of en- 11-13
tries and as to what he thought of them; the appellant claiming that an accountant cannot give his opinion
as to what the entry was but only as to the entry and as
to the result of his calculation." Under this general objection, fourteen of the fifty-two separtely stated assignments of error have been grouped. We have examined all
of the assignments so grouped in the light of the foregoing
criticism, and except for assignments numbered 26, 27, and
28, none of them is subject to such objection. By assignment No. 26 it is shown that Mr. Guiver was asked whether
he was able to state if any of the general shortage reflects
itself in the personal checking account of Leon L. Olson.
The court overruling the objection that the question called
for a conclusion of the witness and that the records speak
for themselves, the witness answered, "Yes sir." Considered a preliminary question seeking the opinion of the
witness as an expert accountant as to whether, according
to the correct practice of accountancy, he was able to state
from the examination of the books and accounts of the bank
that he had made any portion of the shortage was reflected
in the personal checking account of Mr. Olson, the question
is not subject to appellant's objection. But counsel for the
state is then expected to follow it up and develop with some
particularity just how the witness was able to ascertain
such fact from the books and records and accounts of the
bank so that the trial judge may determine as a matter of
law whether there was any competent probative value to
the finding of the witness in such particular in order that
he might know whether to submit it to or withhold it from
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the jury. This was not done, and the answer stands in the
record as a mere conclusion. It is then followed up with a
question directing the witness to examine his report made
to the state bank commissioner containing the result of the
witness' audit of the bank books and records to refresh his
memory and give the amount thus reflected. Over the objection that it was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial,
the witness was permitted to answer "$6,379.00." That is
the subject of the twenty-seventh assignment. As before
stated, it is incompetent for the reason that as it stands it
is but the conclusion of the witness. Accountants and other
competent persons are permitted as a matter of convenience
to state what the books contain or what they do not contain
(San Pedro L. Co. V. Reynolds, 121 Cal. 74, 53 P. 410), if
the negative is relevant, as it often is, and as it undoubtedly
was in this particular instance. It may be true that an
expert accountant, by an examination of Mr. Olson's checking account and all the credit slips with reference thereto,
might find an insufficient number of credit slips to make
up the total amount of credits which had actually been
posted to the credit of this account. He might also find in
his examination of the credit slips pertaining to other individual accounts that credits had not been posted to those
accounts corresponding with the credit slips, but that corresponding amounts at about the same time had been posted
as credits in Mr. Olson's account. This would all have
cogent probative value, and most certainly should be permitted to go to the jury. To have made the state's question
competent, the witness would have had to lay before the
court and jury such facts which he found or failed to find
in the books and which led him to the conclusion that
$6,370 of the general shortage was traceable to the Olson
account. Assignment No. 28 involves the same principle.
Though we find there was error in this particular, we are
unable to see how it could have been prejudicial, under the
state of the record in this case. This information erroneously placed before the jury tended to connect the defen-
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INDEX

dant with the general shortage, and nothing else. His
connection is, as we think, established, if not conclusively,
at least beyond a reasonable doubt, by his own admissions
upon three occasions, as is shown in the statement of the
evidence. Such error, under the foregoing facts, was not
prejudicial.

ACTION.
PLAINTIFF WAIVING COXTERSIOX AND CLAIMING PROCEEDS RATIFIED

SALE OF AUTOMOBILE BY DEFENDANT. Where plaintiff, in action

to recover damages for conversion of automobile, in its amended
complaint waived tort and claimed proceeds of sale, it thereby
ratified and approved sale of automobile by defendant.
Taylor
Motor Car Co. V. Hansen, SO.

Further assignments of error are predicated on the
court's refusal to give certain requested instructions to the
jury. We have made a careful examination of each of the
requests as well as the statements of counsel in connection
therewith. We find each of the assignments to be without
merit.

ACTIONS, LIMITATION OF. See "Limitation of Actions."
ADMINISTRATORS. See "Executors and Administrators."
APPEAL AND ERROR. See "Criminal Law."
1.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANTS" EMPLOYEE REQUESTED PLAINTIFF,
KICKED BY HORSE, TO DRIVE EO?.SE INTO BARN, WITHOUT PROOF
OF EMPLOYEE'S AUTHORITY, HELD PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANTS..

In action for injuries to bey kicked by horse belonging to defendants as copartners, testimony that person employed by defendants to drive milk wagon requested plaintiff and his companion to drive horse into the barn, without proof of such employee's authority, held prejudicial as having a tendency not only
to influence general verdict for plaintiff but also jury's answers
to interrogatories submitted Lc'sney V. Bingham Dairy et aL, 53.

CHERRY, C. J., and STRAUP, ELIAS HANSEN, and
FOLLAND, JJ., concur.

2.

TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS IN LAW CASES ARE APPROVED, IF S U P PORTED BY SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE. In law cases, find-

ings of trial court are approved if there is sufficient competent
evidence to support them, and are not disturbed, unless it is
manifest that they are so clearly against weight of evidence as
to indicate a misconception, or nc~ a due consideration of it. Jensen et aL V. Howell et at, 64.
3.

APPEAL IN EQUITY CASES I S IN EFFECT TRIAL D E NOVO, AND
IF TRIAL COURT'S FINDING? AEE AGAINST GREATER WEIGHT OF

EVIDENCE THEY WILL BE DISAPPROVED. Appeals in equity cases are

in effect trial de novo on the record, and, if after making due
allowance as to better opportunely of trial court to observe demeanor of witnesses, their credibility, and weight of their testimony, appellate court is persuaded that trial court's findings are
against preponderance or clear weight of evidence, appellate court
will disprove it, and make or direct a finding, or remand case
for further proceedings. Id.
4.

SUBMITTING IMMATERIAL ISSUE WHETHER AUTOMOBILE DEFENDANT
RESOLD W A S CONDITIONALLY PURCHASED FROM PLAINTIFF, A S K ING ACCOUNTING, HELD NOT HARMFUL TO PLAINTIFF. Where issue

of whether automobile defendant sold had been conditionally sold
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Cite «•
2 Utah 2d 371
Th« STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Jay D. FERRY, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 8(81.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 26, 1054.
Defendant was convicted of carnal
knowledge. The Fifth Judicial District
Court, Millard County, Will L. Iloyt, J.,
rendered judgment on the verdict, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court,
Hcnriod, J., held that a deputy sheriff's
testimony that defendant answered "y cs "
when the girl involved inquired if it were
right that they had relations was not independent evidence of quantum and quality
required to prove the corpus delicti before
defendant's confession may be used to establish his guilt, where the girl refused to
appear at the trial and subject herself to
cross-examination.
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3. Criminal Law C^5I7(4)
In prosecution for carnal knowledge,
which defendant confessed in writing,
deputy sheriff's testimony that defendant
answered "yes" v. hen girl involved inquired
if it were right that they had relations was
merely evidence of second confession,
which alone could not be used to prove
corpus delicti, as required before confession
may be used to establish defendant's guilt.

Aldrich & Bullock, Provo, for appellant.
E. R. Callister, Jr., Atty. Gen., Walter L.
Budge, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.
HENRIOD, Justice.
Appeal from a carnal knowledge conviction. Reversed with instructions to grant
defendant's motion to dismiss.

Only facts requiring documentation here
substantially arc as follows: Defendant
confessed in writing, and, according to a
Judgment reversed with instructions. deputy sheriff's testimony, answered "yes"
when the girl in question inquired if it were
1. Criminal Law €=535(2), 538(3)
right that the two had relations. The gi^l
An accused cannot be convicted on his and her mother refused to attend the trial
confession alone, but there must also be which proceeded after denial of a prosecuindependent, clear and convincing evidence
tion motion for a continuance.
of corpus delicti, though it need not be con[1] An accused cannot be convicted on
vincing beyond reasonable doubt.
his confession alone. l Wc believe and hold
2. Criminal Law 0=406(1), 517(4)
that in addition there must be independent,
In prosecution for carnal knowledge,
clear and convincing evidence of the corpus
deputy sheriff's testimony that defendant
delicti, 2 although wc and the authorities
answered "yes" when girl involved, who
generally do not require it to be convincing
refused to appear at trial and subject herbeyond a reasonable doubt. 3
self to cross-examination, inquired if it
were right that she and defendant had rela[2] The only independent evidence
tions, was not independent evidence of which might tend to establish a corpus
quantum and quality required to prove delicti and lend credence to the confession
corpus delicti before defendant's confession here, is the testimony of the deputy, the
may be used to establish his guilt, though substance of which, at best, was the 'stateadmissible under exception to hearsay rule. ment of a person that refused to appear

I. 127 A.L.R. 1131.
2. In Stnte v. Wells. 1000, ,T> Utah 400,
100 P. f>81, 13G Am.St.Rrp. 1050. 10 Ann.
Ca*. 631, wc hold the independent evidence must prove the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt; in State v.
Johnson. 1938, 05 Utah 572, 83 I\2d
1010, wc softened that rule by Baying
such proof need not be conclusive; we

enunciate the rule in our present decision, to clarify the matter, feeling that
such rule, already announced in Arizona
in Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 00, 207 P.
1029, is the soundest of those heretofore
enuueiated by the authorities. See also.
State v. Crank, 1043. 105 Utah 332, 142
r.2d 178. 170 A.L.R. 542.
3. 127 A.L.R. 1130.
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and subject herself to cross-examination,
thus precluding any test of the truth of the
iitatement purportedly made or the veracity
of the one who made it. Such hearsay,
even though admissible under an exception
to the hearsay rule, 4 but of doubtful materiality in this case, in our opinion falls far
short of the quantum and quality of independent evidence which the authorities require in proving the corpus delicti before
a confession may be used to establish guilt.
To hold otherwise would open the door to
possible injustice from the fabricated testimony of one, who, knowing that a person
could not or would not appear to testify,
and without fear of recrimination, easily
could put words in the mouth of an absentee
that could be highly prejudicial to an ac-

iRIES

cuscd when viewed in the light of the
lattcr's confession. Our traditional zeal in
safeguarding the rights of an accused
would preclude conviction on such an unsubstantial basis.
[3] Besides the above, the evidence
adduced by the deputy's statement was that
merely of a second confession. To say a
second confession, with nothing more, could
be used to prove the corpus delicti, obviously would be to devour the rule itself, which
is predicated on the fact that one confession
alone, with nothing more, cannot prove the
corpus delicti,—there being no magic or
significance to a repetition thereof.
MCDONOUGH, C. J., and CROCKETT,
W A D E and W O R T I I E N , JJ., concur.

4. 20 Am.Jur. 483,

Sec. 570, Evidence.
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den. In that case, however, the trial court
dismissed the robbery charge on its own
volition. That is not the case here.
The District Attorney's office, an arm
of the state, and under the direct supervision of the Attorney General (67-5-1),
that is appealing here,—a somewhat unorthodox and inconsistent circumstance,—
made the motion to dismiss the action,
which at that point was as much an issue
as Combs' restraint of liberty. It would
seem that before this court orders the
trial court to do much of anything the
matter of that motion to dismiss and the
resulting dismissal, all for a presumably
good cause, should be resolved.
In addition to the position I take on the
aspect of this case reflected in the paragraph immediately above, I urge that perhaps we made a mistake in the remand
portion of the McGuffey case and that we
should overrule that part of it. The instant case itself seems to point up the advisability of so doing. To do anything
more could lead us on safari in a civil
proceeding down a road into an erstwhile
juristic jungle of no return.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Charles BUGGER, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 12278.

Supreme Court of Utah.
April 6, 1971.

Defendant was convicted in the Second
District Court, Davis County, Thornley K.
Swan, J., of being in actual physical control of his vehicle while under influence
of intoxicating liquor, and he appealed.
The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., held that
defendant who was asleep in his automobile which was completely off traveled por-

tion of highway and whose motor was not
running at time investigating officer
awakened defendant and detected smell of
alcohol was not in "actual physical control
of any vehicle" in violation of statute
proscribing such behavior at time of his
arrest.
Reversed.
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion.

Automobiles C=332
Defendant who was asleep in his automobile which was completely off traveled
portion of highway and whose motor was
not running at time investigating officer
awakened defendant and detected smell of
alcohol was not in "actual physical control
of any vehicle" in violation of statute
proscribing such behavior at time of his
arrest. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

Robert Van Sciver, Van Sciver, Florence, Hutchison & Sharp, Salt Lake City,
for defendant-appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Lauren
N. Beasley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff-respondent.
TUCKETT, Justice:
The defendant was found guilty of a
violation of Section 41-6-44, U.C.A.1953,
and from that conviction he has appealed
to this court.
During the night of July 28, 1969, the
defendant was asleep in his automobile
which was parked upon the shoulder of *
road known as Tippet's Lane in Davis
County. The automobile was completely
off the traveled portion of the highway
and the motor was not running. An offi ccf
of the Highway Patrol stopped at the scene
and discovered the defendant was asleep
With some effort the officer succeeded >*J
awakening the defendant, at which time tn
officer detected the smell of alcohol an
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rrested the defendant for being in actual
hysical control of the vehicle while under
^c influence of intoxicating liquor.
The complaint charges the defendant
with the violation of the statute above referred to which provides as follows:
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in subsection (d) of this section
for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive or be
in actual physical control of any vehicle
within this state.
The defendant is here challenging the
validity of the statute on the grounds of
vagueness. However, we need not decide
the case upon that ground.LThat part of
the statute which states: "be in actual physical control of any vehicle" has been before the courts of other jurisdictions which
have statutes with similar wordings. The
word "actual" has been defined as meaning "existing in act or reality; * * * in
action or existence at the time being;
present; * * *." The word "physical"
is defined as "bodily," and "control" is defined as "to exercise restraining or directing influence over; to dominate; regulate;
hence, to hold from actions; to curb."
The term in "actual physical control" in
its ordinary sense means "existing" or
"present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation." £J It is
clear that in the record before us the facts
do not bring the case within the wording
of the statute. The defendant at the time
of his arrest was not controlling the vehicle, nor was he exercising any dominion
over it. It is noted that the cases cited by
the plaintiff in support of its position in
this matter deal with entirely different fact
situations, such as the case where the driver
was seated in his vehicle on the traveled
portion of the highway; or where the motor of the vehicle was operating; or where
the driver was attempting to steer the automobile while it was in motion; or where
I. State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d
338; State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 243,
321 P.2d 615; Ohio v. Wil*us, Com.Pl.,

he was attempting to brake the vehicle to
arrest its motion.
We are of the opinion that the facts in
this case do not make out a violation of
the statute and the defendant's conviction
is reversed. We do not consider it necessary to discuss the other claimed errors
raised by the defendant.
CALLISTER, C J., and HENRIOD
and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent.
The statute formerly made it unlawful
for a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive any vehicle upon any
highway within this state.1 The amendment
added a provision making it unlawful to
be in actual physical control of a vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. It removed the need to be upon a
highway before the crime was made out
and did away with the necessity of driving
before a crime was committed.
The reason for the change is obvious.
It is better to prevent an intoxicated person
in charge of an automobile from getting
on the highway than it is to punish him
after he gets on it. The amended statute
gives officers a right to arrest a drunk
person in the control of an automobile and
thus prevent him from wreaking havoc
a minute later by getting in traffic, or from
injuring himself by his erratic driving.
It does not matter whether the motor
is running or is idle nor whether the drunk
is in the front seat or in the back seat.
His potentiality for harm is lessened but
not obviated by a silent motor or a backseat position—provided, of course, that he
is the one in control of the car. It only
takes a flick of the wrist to start the motor
or to engage the gears, and it requires only
a moment of time to get under the wheel
from the back seat. A drunk in control
17 Ohio Supp. 34; Parker v. State (Okl.
CrApp.), 424 P.2d 997; 47 A.L.R.2d 582.
I. Sec. 57-7-14, R.S.U.1933.
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of a motor vehicle has such a propensity
to cause harm that the statute intended to
make it criminal for him to be in a position
to do so.
Restraining the movement of a vehicle
is controlling it as much as moving it is.
A person finding a drunk in the back seat
of a car parked in one's driveway is likely
to learn who is in control of that car if
he should attempt to move it. A drunk
may maliciously block one's exit, and in
doing so he is in control of his own vehicle.
I think the defendant in this case was in
control of his truck within the meaning of
the statute even though he may have been
asleep. He had the key and was the only
one who could drive it. The fact that he
chose to park it is no reason to say he was
not in control thereof.
I, therefore, think that we should consider the question which he raises in his
brief as to the validity of the statute.

In the case of Parker v. State, 424 P.2d
997 (Okl.Cr.App.1967), the appellant challenged the constitutionality of a statute
making it unlawful for "any person who is
under the influence of intoxicating liquor
to drive, operate, or be in actual physical
control of any motor vehicle within this
state," There the defendant (appellant)
claimed that the statute was unconstitutional in that it was so vague and indefinite
that a person charged thereunder would be
deprived of due process of law. The court
held that the statute did not violate any
of appellant's constitutional rights.
Under a similar statute the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Ruona, 133 Mont.
243, 321 P.2d 615 (1958), held that the
statute was not void for vagueness, and in
doing so said:
* * * Thus one could have "actual
physical control" while merely parking
or standing still so long as one was
keeping the car in restraint or in position to regulate its movements. Preventing a car from moving is as much control
and dominion as actually putting the car
in motion on the highway. Could one
exercise any more regulation over a
thing, while bodily present, than prevention of movement or curbing movement.
As long as one were physically or bodily
able to assert dominion, in the sense of
movement, then he has as much control
over an object as he would if he were
actually driving the vehicle.

Cases wherein an attack was made on
statutes like ours have been decided in a
number of jurisdictions. They hold the
statute good
In the case of State v. Webb, 78 Ariz.
8, 274 P.2d 338 (1954), the defendant was
intoxicated and asleep in a truck parked
next to some barricades in a lane of traffic. An officer passed by and observed
no one in the car. Later he returned and
found the defendant "passed out." The
statute made it a crime to be in actual
physical control of a car while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. The defendant contended that the wording of the
statute was not meant to apply to a situation where the car was parked and that it
was only concerned with the driving of an
automobile and other acts and conduct of a
positive nature. In holding that the statute
was applicable to the conduct of the defendant, the court said:
An intoxicated person seated behind
the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is
a threat to the safety and welfare of
the public. The danger is less than that

* * * [I]t is quite evident that the
statute in the instant c a s s i s neither
vague nor uncertain. *
The appellant here claims some federally
protected rights in that he says he was >mproperly arrested. It is difficult for me °
see where that has anything to do w'th
guilt or innocence. If he were .mproperly
arrested, he would have an actum again*
,he officer for false arrest, but surely e £
courts have not lost contact tnth « * « J
t 0 the extent that we turn a gu.l y ma"
* , ~ trniDlv "because the constable tna>

From what has been said
Hs absolutely no merit to th
[being in control of an aut<
•> under the influence of intox
^ the defendant was guilty of <
which was in the presence <
and the officer had a right
arrest him.*
* The defendant was found
court below of being in s
control of his truck while
the influence of intoxicatii
does not dispute that he was
statute is good, we should
overrule the trier of the
that the defendant was not
u
' controlling his truck.
I would affirm the judgr
court.
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m what has been said above, there
k absolutely no merit to this claim. By
.
;n control of an automobile while
Vder the influence of intoxicating liquor,
T defendant was guilty of a misdemeanor
r
hich was in the presence of the officer,
Jnd the officer had a right and a duty to
Arrest him 2
•""•The defendant was found guilty in the
Fcourt below of being in actual physical
Iftontrol of his truck while he was under
a
Ue influence of intoxicating liquor. He
ifdoes not dispute that he was drunk. If the
^statute is good, we should not attempt to
Overrule the trier of the facts and find
*\hat the defendant was not the one actuall y controlling his truck.
^ I would affirm the judgment of the trial
jr court.

O

1. Insurance <S=>452
Person on foot does not cease to be
"pedestrian" within policy covering injuries sustained while a pedestrian merely
because he is not in motion.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Insurance <S=5452
Where farmer was working about
idling farm tractor located on his private
property and it rolled forward and crushed
him, he was "pedestrian" within policy
covering injury "sustained in consequence
of being struck by any land conveyance
while a pedestrian."

Thomas S. Taylor, of Chnstensen, Taylor & Moody, Provo, for defendant-appellant.
Tex R. Olsen, of Olsen & Chamberlain,
Richfield, for plaintiff-respondent.
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HENRIOD, Justice:

Irene A. PETERSON, Plaintiff

and Respondent,
v.
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, a
c: corporation, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 12187.

Supreme Court of Utah.
March 29, 1971.

Appeal by insurer from judgment of
the Sixth District Court, Sevier County,
Ferdinand Enckson, J., holding that deceased was covered by accident policy.
[The Supreme Court, Henriod, J., held that
where farmer was working about idling
^farm tractor located on his private property and it rolled forward and crushed him,
jhe was "pedestrian" within policy covering
injury "sustained in consequence of being
struck by any land conveyance while a pedestrian."
Affirmed.
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion.

Appeal from what was labeled a summary judgment for plaintiff which actually
was a judgment on all available facts, under an insurance policy covering injury
"sustained in consequence of being struck
by any land conveyance while a pedestrian." Affirmed, with costs to plaintiff.
Believable evidence elicited under the
discovery process indicates that plaintiffs
farmer husband was crushed by a tractor
that, driverless, had rolled down a rise, all
of which occurred on his private property.
The only question is whether the deceased was a "pedestrian" under the terms
of the policy. The trial court said he was,
—a conclusion with which we agree,—no
one questioning the fact that the tractor
was a "land conveyance," and it appearing
that the vehicle, out of gear, simply traveled downhill as mentioned, and quite obviously ran over the deceased.
[1,2] Appellant indulges a non sequitur
by assuming that coverage u p ^ r ^** nnlicy

2. Sec. 77-13-3(1), U.C.A.1953.

